I am a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. My research interests are the industrial organization of health markets and econometrics. I will join the Department of Economics at Cornell University as an Assistant Professor in Fall 2025.
I received my PhD in Economics from Princeton University in May 2024. My advisor was Kate Ho. Before starting graduate school, I received a BS in mathematics with a specialization in economics from the University of Chicago in 2017 and was a Stanford Law Empirical Research Fellow under John Donohue III between 2017 and 2018.
PhD in Economics, 2024
Princeton University
MS in Economics, 2020
Princeton University
BS in Mathematics with a Specialization in Economics, 2018
University of Chicago
We propose semiparametric average treatment effect (ATE) bounds estimators with novel robustness properties: double sharpness and double validity.
The large literature on vertical market bargaining assumes contracts last for one period, but actual hospital-insurer contracts last for multiple years and are negotiated as a multiple of a benchmark price that changes over time. I study dynamic regulations to those benchmark prices by extending the existing single-period approach to vertical market bargaining to enable contracts that are formed at different times.
I investigate vertical market contract dynamics by documenting and analyzing a novel panel dataset of hospital–insurer contracts in West Virginia. The largest insurer typically formed three- and five-year contracts. In contrast, smaller insurers generally formed long-lived contracts with faster price growth. By documenting a unique dataset and stark dynamic implications, this research contributes to a larger understanding of vertical market dynamics and helps set the stage for future work.
I study auto-renew share of charges contracts, which are associated with small insurers paying high prices to American hospitals. I demonstrate that under certain conditions, these contracts can lead to Pareto improvements. The key feature of these contracts is the renewal process, which enables the insurers to discipline hospital charges with the threat of contract termination and renegotiation.
In-person: Spring 2022 (Preceptor)
In-person: Spring 2021
In-person: Fall 2014-Spring 2015 (Tutor)